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One of the principal projects in international sovereign finance from 2001 
through 2003 was the effort on the part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
to encourage emerging-market borrowers to include so-called collective-action 
clauses in the debt instruments they offered in international markets.1 Such 
clauses create mechanisms that allow a specified majority of a borrower’s 
creditors (or the creditors’ representatives) to take action that is binding on all 
the creditors, even those which do not agree to the action. Though controversial 
at the outset, this effort ultimately turned out to be remarkably successful in 
changing market practice: beginning with the inclusion of collective-action 
provisions in Mexico’s offering of $1 billion of dollar-denominated bonds in 
February of 2003, major emerging-market borrowers rapidly followed suit over 
the following year, and by 2005 over ninety-five percent of newly issued 
sovereign debt included provisions for collective action.2 
The merits of these provisions have been debated thoroughly, both at the 
time the Treasury urged their inclusion and afterward,3 and I do not propose to 
recapitulate those arguments here. Nor do I intend to provide a comprehensive 
history of the process that resulted in these changes in market practice; that, 
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too, has been done thoroughly by others.4 As anyone who has been part of any 
complex policy initiative knows, however, those two categories—what the 
participants ought to have been doing, and what they actually were doing—are 
often not the entire story. There is the third question of what the parties thought 
they were doing, which differs surprisingly frequently from either what they 
should have done or actually did do, and can reveal motivations and incentives 
that would not otherwise be obvious. This contribution to this symposium is of 
the third kind: I want simply to describe some of the thinking of the officials in 
the U.S. Treasury as we pursued this initiative on collective action in sovereign 
debt. Our reasons might not necessarily have been the best reasons; our 
perceptions of events were certainly incomplete, perhaps sometimes mistaken. 
But here are some observations on what we thought we were doing. 
II 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES 
The senior Treasury officials of the George W. Bush Administration arrived 
in 2001 with a number of goals, one of the clearest of which was in the area of 
sovereign finance: We intended to change the practice that had developed 
during the 1990s of increasingly large-ticket, heavily intrusive assistance to 
sovereign debtors in crisis involving the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the Group of Seven nations (G7), and sometimes an even broader group of 
sovereigns. Beginning with the Mexican debt crises of 1994 and through the end 
of the decade, there were roughly fifteen serious crises in Latin America, Asia, 
and Russia, with the size and frequency of the intervention packages increasing 
steadily.5 
The policy arguments both for and against such intervention are familiar: on 
the one hand, the risk that if a sovereign defaulted on its obligations, the 
resulting financial contagion would destabilize emerging markets generally—
even those that were quite sound—and, on the other, the moral hazard of 
increased sovereign risk-taking and diminished market discipline ensuing from 
the bailout. The Treasury team of the ‘90s believed that, in each particular 
crisis, the potential consequences of contagion outweighed the risk of moral 
hazard and so justified the particular intervention; this new team saw the 
steadily increasing size and volume of bailouts and put greater weight on the 
importance of limiting moral hazard and thus finding alternatives to large-scale 
intervention. 
The difference in views on this issue between the two Treasury teams was 
driven, however, not simply by different weights given to contagion and moral 
hazard but even more fundamentally by different approaches to the process of 
decisionmaking itself. Robert Rubin, the Treasury Secretary during most of the 
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QUARLES 11/6/2010 
Fall 2010] COLLECTIVE-ACTION CLAUSES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT 31 
‘90s, believed that good decisionmaking began by accepting that nothing critical 
to a decision was provably certain, so every good decision started with an 
assessment of probabilities. A good decider evaluated as much information as 
could be reasonably obtained about a particular situation, judged the odds of 
various outcomes and possible gains or losses associated with each, and acted 
accordingly.6 Members of Secretary Rubin’s Treasury team have said this 
decisionmaking process—as much as any particular policy view that may have 
resulted from it—was essential to how they approached the world.7 
This is an appealingly pragmatic and commonsensical view, and the clear 
implication is that strict decision rules that limit the freedom of policymakers to 
act as required in complex situations are usually not desirable because the full 
range of facts can never be known in advance. A strict policy rule is not 
absolutely inconsistent with such an approach: among the probabilities to be 
evaluated, for example, could be the potential for the politics of a situation to 
force policymakers to act in a way contrary to their evaluation of the odds; the 
best decision in that case might be to adopt a rule that limits their discretion and 
their corresponding ability to be pressured. Nonetheless, such a rule emphasizes 
the importance of applying discretion intelligently to the specific facts of each 
situation. 
The Treasury officials appointed in 2001, however, arrived with a general 
skepticism about the merits of discretionary intervention by government not 
just in sovereign financial crises, but across the range of government action. 
Although this resulted partly from the weight given moral-hazard concerns, it 
was driven just as much by a fundamental concern about the uncertainty that 
the exercise of discretion by governments creates throughout the financial and 
economic system. When governments have discretion, markets and citizens 
cannot be sure how the government will act, and that uncertainty results in 
inefficiency, delay, and politicization. Governments can limit both moral hazard 
and uncertainty by refraining from intervention when possible, and when action 
of some sort is inherent in the government’s mandate (as in issuing debt or 
executing monetary policy), by developing and sticking to clear, predictable 
rules for action, thus putting boundaries on what decisions can result from a 
weighing of the pros and cons. 
The best and most influential example of this mindset among the new 
Treasury team was that of John Taylor, the incoming Under Secretary for 
International Affairs. Taylor was a highly respected economist from Stanford 
who had done much work on the relative desirability of policy rules as opposed 
to discretion in government action. In fact, perhaps the most famous example of 
a policy rule of this sort was a rule Taylor had developed to guide monetary 
policy, which has become known as the “Taylor Rule.” Based on a clear and 
simple relationship between inflation, unemployment, and the gap between 
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actual and potential economic output, the Taylor Rule has come to be used by 
central banks throughout the world as a key input in their decisions.8 
Although the Taylor Rule was the most well-known example of the mindset 
that the Bush Treasury team would bring to decisionmaking, the roots of this 
approach reach back much further: I have always believed that many of the new 
Treasury officials took much from their earlier association with George Shultz. 
Paul O’Neill (the new Treasury Secretary) and Ken Dam (the new Deputy 
Secretary) had worked closely with Shultz in the Nixon and Ford 
Administrations. Dam had also been Shultz’s Deputy Secretary of State in the 
Reagan Administration, and John Taylor had been a close colleague of Shultz’s 
at Stanford, where they were both fellows of the Hoover Institution. All these 
individuals referred to George Shultz as a key mentor, and they arranged for 
him to speak to the senior Treasury staff on the difficulties of policymaking 
early in the new Administration. 
George Shultz has famously told the story of his first major challenge as 
Secretary of Labor in the late ‘60s.9 In that era, significant labor disputes were 
almost always protracted conflicts that were never solved without extensive and 
athletic mediation from the federal government. In his academic work, 
however, Shultz had been an early proponent of the view that 
private collective bargaining . . . was being subverted by too much government 
involvement; that potential crises from strikes tended to be overrated and 
overdramatized; that high officials should refuse to become involved and certainly 
should not attempt to force the parties to settle their disputes; and that the clear 
willingness of high administration officials to become involved resulted in their 
exploitation by labor or management in a process where “supply created its own 
demand.”10 
As Shultz put it, “[I]f the president hangs out his shingle, of course he’ll get 
all the business.”11 
When Shultz took office in 1969, there was enormous pressure on the new 
Secretary to intervene in a crippling longshoremen’s strike on the East Coast 
that had already been underway for a month. Shultz resisted this pressure, 
maintaining that discretionary government intervention exacerbated problems 
over the long run and that government’s role was to set transparent, predictable 
rules for private activity and then to stick with them.12 
And the result? When the parties saw they could not draw the federal 
government into their conflict, they realized they would have to solve it on their 
own and turned to doing that. The public came to realize that government 
intervention in labor disputes, and the opportunities for political pressure, 
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gamesmanship, and further negotiation that intervention created, was unlikely 
to be forthcoming. And when President Ford handed over the reins to President 
Carter in 1977, not only were there no emergency boards or mediation 
processes in operation, there were no strikes underway or in the offing across 
the whole of the country.13 
Without wanting to make too much of this analogy, I have thought of this 
contrast between the two Treasury teams as the difference between a “common 
law” and a “statutory” approach to government decisionmaking. For the ‘90s 
Treasury team, each sovereign crisis was like a case at common law: it was to be 
resolved in the way most appropriate to the facts of that case with a solution 
designed to relieve immediate, significant distress; it was modeled on the way 
similarly situated cases had been handled in the past; and it took into account 
all the factors that rendered each new case unique. Our approach, by contrast, 
was to be driven by a rule—analogous to a statute—that would impose a strict 
limit on where the logic of a particular case could take us. We wanted to live by 
a hard constraint on the system’s ability to bail out private parties or to 
construct complicated, opaque arrangements, even when those options might 
seem to make sense given a particular set of facts. This “statutory” approach 
was rooted in our concern about the longer-term implications—much in the way 
that statutes, sentencing guidelines, and other limits on judges’ discretion have 
been devised to increase deterrence and reduce uncertainty in the criminal law. 
And it is fair to say that, in many ways, the differences in decisionmaking of 
these two Treasury teams extended over time the views of two different 
individuals who were not merely significant actors at a particular time in the 
past, but mentors to colleagues who would carry these approaches forward over 
a much longer period. President Obama’s economic team, for example, is 
composed of many people who served under Rubin during the ‘90s, and they 
appear to have brought to the 2008–2009 financial crisis the same approach to 
decisionmaking and policy development. One of the chief critics of the 
interventionist response to the domestic financial crisis has been John Taylor. 
George Shultz and Bob Rubin have cast very long shadows. 
III 
SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
Having come into office determined to change the practice of intervention 
in sovereign crises, the Bush Administration was presented with its first 
challenge in August of 2001 when an accelerating sovereign debt crisis in 
Argentina triggered a destabilizing slow run on the banking system and raised 
the prospect of imminent default. Our team tried to encourage a market-based 
restructuring that would have avoided default without the need for IMF or G7 
intervention. But as the month of August progressed, it became clear that the 
various possibilities for restructuring were stymied by some basic provisions in 
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the bond contracts—principally the negative-pledge clause, which prevented the 
borrower from giving secured collateral to a subsequent lender. 
Negative-pledge clauses are nearly universal in unsecured debt contracts: 
few lenders would be willing to become unsecured creditors if a borrower could 
impair its financial condition by taking on substantial additional debt while 
giving later lenders priority claims on the assets available to pay the debt. In 
normal circumstances, these negative-pledge clauses play a valuable role in 
encouraging market discipline and preventing the development of unstable debt 
structures. But once a crisis has developed, it could be in everyone’s interest—
including the unsecured bondholders—for a borrower to be able to attract 
additional funds by giving some appropriate priority to the new bondholders. 
Most of the restructuring ideas being considered for Argentina in the summer 
of 2001 depended, at least to some degree, on Argentina’s giving new lenders a 
security interest in future revenues. This could not be done without permission 
from the beneficiaries of the negative pledge, but the bond contracts had no 
mechanism for that permission to be given short of a unanimous vote of the 
affected bondholders, which was impossible to obtain as a practical matter. 
Many of our counterparts at the IMF and in other G7 finance ministries had 
considerable doubt about the merits of the financial engineering that underlay 
these various restructuring ideas. In hindsight, it is not clear that any of the 
particular approaches we had under consideration in August of 2001 would 
have improved Argentina’s position beyond delaying, and perhaps worsening, 
the inevitable. But at the time it was extremely frustrating not to be able to 
consider them as options. The officials who were not lawyers and thus not as 
familiar with the positive aspects of negative-pledge provisions were 
particularly annoyed. Secretary O’Neill asked us in one internal discussion to 
consider a legislative project to prohibit negative-pledge clauses in sovereign 
debt entirely. Eventually, we persuaded him that the problem was not with the 
negative-pledge clause itself, which served a useful role in the ordinary course 
of events, but with Argentina’s practical inability under its bond contracts to 
negotiate a waiver of the negative-pledge clause in times of distress, even when 
such a waiver would be in the collective interests of the bondholders as well as 
the borrower. In the end, we agreed in late August to a moderate $8 billion 
increase in IMF lending to Argentina—a “last chance,” as it were. This was not 
our preferred outcome, but we felt we had been forced into it given our limited 
options. And in the minds of many of the Treasury’s senior officials, including 
the Treasury Secretary, the principal obstacle to expanding our options was the 
negative-pledge clause. 
It was in this context that Secretary O’Neill, John Taylor, and I met for 
breakfast in September with Horst Kohler, the Managing Director of the IMF, 
and Anne Krueger, his chief deputy and the senior American at the IMF. These 
breakfasts with the senior officials at the IMF and the senior international 
staffers at the Treasury occur frequently on a Treasury Secretary’s schedule—
every month or so—and this was the first to occur after the events of August. 
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Argentina was still in a precarious position even after the advance of additional 
funds from the IMF. Much of the discussion at this breakfast involved the 
obstacles to restructuring created by the terms of the bonds, including the 
negative-pledge clause. Secretary O’Neill had accepted the arguments against 
entirely prohibiting the negative-pledge clause, but he had continued to give 
thought to the problem and surprised us all by strongly encouraging the IMF to 
develop an international sovereign bankruptcy process. Just as in a domestic 
bankruptcy, such a process would allow a tribunal to override the terms of debt 
contracts—including negative-pledge clauses—in order to allow a restructuring 
of the debt when that was in the overall interest of claimants on the borrower. 
And given the stresses we were expecting in the international area, speed was 
important; at that breakfast, O’Neill said he thought the process should be in 
place by December of that year. 
I was skeptical that something as complicated and controversial as an 
international sovereign bankruptcy process could ever be negotiated, certainly 
not within three months. Even if it could ever be put in place, I thought the 
ability to avoid politicization of such a tribunal’s decisions was slim. An 
international sovereign bankruptcy tribunal would never be as rule-bound and 
interference-free as a domestic bankruptcy court in the United States, so the 
benefit of additional restructuring flexibility in distress would be bought at too 
high a cost in increased uncertainty about the outcomes of the insolvency 
process. 
I also knew, however, that Secretary O’Neill’s fundamental goal was not the 
creation of a bankruptcy regime, but the expansion of restructuring options in 
the face of otherwise intractable bond covenants—and I believed this could be 
achieved in a different way. Among the legal work I had done over the years 
was advising financial institutions on structuring derivative contracts. (One of 
my principal clients had been J.P. Morgan, which was one of the most active 
participants in the development of new and complex derivatives.) Derivative 
contracts were often intended to combine certain attributes of one type of 
security with certain attributes of an entirely different type of security, but this 
hybridization often meant that the resulting instrument “fell between two 
stools” as far as the law was concerned, so the rights of its holders might not be 
governed by standard provisions of law. As a result, those rights often had to be 
spelled out explicitly in the derivative contracts themselves. I had grown used to 
assuming that the legal regime one preferred to govern the rights of parties to 
any contract could be specified by agreement between the parties to the 
contract, even when that regime might not apply automatically under the law 
itself. With that mindset, providing a mechanism in the debt contracts 
themselves for modifying the terms of the foreign bonds when that was in the 
best interests of both bondholders and borrower seemed the most 
straightforward and practical way to meet that objective and to carry out 
Secretary O’Neill’s wish to expand restructuring options. This mechanism 
would be a better alternative than creating an external, supranational legal 
regime that would override the terms of those contracts. 
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This idea was very much in tune with our team’s general approach to 
government intervention and decisionmaking, and was thus strongly endorsed 
by John Taylor. It did not rely on government or IMF intervention to achieve 
future debt restructuring (thus limiting moral hazard), and the process was 
more predictable because it was less subject to politicization than a 
supranational tribunal would have been. We also discovered that it could build 
on much consensus-building work that had been done some years earlier in the 
international community on so-called collective-action clauses, which would 
increase the likelihood that the project could move quickly.14 
One obstacle to moving quickly that surprised me was the initial, strong 
resistance that the proposal to include collective-action clauses in sovereign 
bond contracts received from some active buyers of sovereign bonds 
themselves, especially the Emerging Market Traders Association. What we 
were proposing was simply that bondholders would decide among themselves 
when it would be appropriate to modify the terms of a contract, and that such 
modification could happen only when a super-majority of bondholders agreed it 
was in the bondholders’ interest. So I had expected that bondholders would be 
relatively quick to support—or at least not oppose—the adoption of such 
provisions. 
This view was reinforced by what I—rightly or wrongly—understood the 
history of collective action in the restructuring of bonded indebtedness in the 
United States to have been. The law firm at which I had spent my career, Davis 
Polk & Wardwell, had built much of its original prominence on advising the 
railroad reorganizations of the late nineteenth century. Although this was 
somewhat before my time, I had been interested in the history of that era, and 
as a young associate had spent hours late at night after my day’s work was done 
studying the files of those transactions, which were still in the firm’s warehouse. 
The United States had no corporate bankruptcy law during this period, so these 
reorganizations had to be accomplished through negotiated, contractual 
agreement—similar to what we were proposing for sovereign debt. Clauses that 
allowed a majority of creditors to bind all creditors allowed this system to work 
outside of formal bankruptcy. 
Such clauses were not only accepted but strongly desired by bondholders, 
and understandably so, since without them, holdouts and free riders could insist 
on being paid the full amount of their claims even if a majority of bondholders 
accepted a restructuring in order to maximize the prospect of recovery. Even 
after the United States adopted a modern corporate reorganization statute in 
 
 14. Secretary O’Neill supported the collective-action clause approach to his problem, but since his 
fundamental aim was enhancing the restructuring options for distressed sovereign debt, he did not want 
to suspend work on a sovereign bankruptcy process until it was clear that the collective-action clauses 
would work. Accordingly, we encouraged a “dual-track” process—with the Treasury encouraging work 
on collective-action clauses and the IMF developing a sovereign bankruptcy regime called the 
“Sovereign Distress Resolution Mechanism”—until the clauses actually began to be adopted in debt 
contracts seventeen months later. 
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the 1930s, there was still a strong impetus to use these collective-action clauses 
to restructure outside of the new statutory reorganization procedure. This 
impetus was so strong that the New Deal authors of the new bankruptcy 
procedure—who wanted to expand the role of government oversight in the 
process and had a personal and political aversion to the Wall Street firms that 
traditionally conducted these restructurings—eventually included a provision in 
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 that explicitly forbade collective-action 
provisions in the debt of public companies.15 This was expressly intended to 
force all reorganizations to proceed under the supervision of a bankruptcy 
court, since only there could the necessary modification of bond terms be 
accomplished.16 
This history also led me to a hypothesis as to how the practice of forbidding 
collective action in sovereign debt contracts governed by New York law had 
begun in the first place—when it did not seem to make sense given the 
incentives of the parties and when such rigidity had never been the practice in 
competing jurisdictions, especially England. Given the way large law firms 
work, it seemed very likely that decades ago, a young lawyer in one of the large 
New York law firms charged with drafting a sovereign bond contract had taken 
a domestic bond contract as a model, which—because of the Trust Indenture 
Act—would have required unanimous agreement of the bondholders for any 
modification of the bond’s terms. That contract then became a precedent for 
the next one, and so on, and soon enough an iron-clad market practice had 
developed. What is more, it all looked quite normal because New York lawyers 
had grown used to such a provision in their domestic bond indentures. But this 
provision was designed to force reorganization proceedings into the statutory 
bankruptcy process and made sense only in the context of such a process. When 
there was a bankruptcy court, contractual collective action was unnecessary 
because the court provided an alternative mechanism for making the necessary 
modifications to the terms of the bonds that would allow a reorganization to 
take place. Without a bankruptcy court, however, collective-action clauses were 
in everyone’s interest and had thus been a long-standing prior practice. 
Given all the above, I felt that if the participants in the emerging-market 
bond process thought clearly about their real interests and realized the logical 
flaw underlying the provisions they had been living with throughout their 
careers, the vehement and somewhat unreasoning resistance to these clauses 
would subside. In time, this is exactly what happened, but initially the most 
vocal representatives of the market were strongly opposed. They did not, 
however, represent the largest purchasers of emerging-market debt, who waited 
until it seemed as if this project had real prospects of success before engaging 
seriously with the policy question. Eventually, Mohammed El-Erian, who was 
 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006). 
 16. David A. Skeel Jr. provides an interesting and comprehensive review of this history that largely 
reinforces the view I had developed as a young man poring through the Davis Polk warehouse files. See 
generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION (2001). 
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the principal emerging-market investor at Pacific Investment Management 
Company, the largest buyer of sovereign debt, and Paul Denoon at Alliance 
Capital, another large investor, sat down with us separately at the Treasury. 
Both agreed with the points we were making about the bondholder benefits of 
collective action and agreed to signal to the issuers of such debt that they would 
continue to be buyers of bonds that included such provisions. It was only a 
matter of weeks after those discussions that Mexico issued bonds containing 
such covenants for the first time. The speed with which the prior market 
practice changed—so that now the inclusion of such provisions in sovereign 
debt under New York law is almost as common as their exclusion was earlier—
is, I think, evidence that these provisions do further all parties’ interests. In 
addition, the “domino effect” of the Mexican precedent provides at least some 
indirect support for my belief about how the original practice had developed in 
the first place, given how easy it is for a prominent precedent to become the 
unquestioned market standard. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
These reflections represent at least one participant’s views about what the 
U.S. Treasury thought it was doing in pursuing the collective-action project in 
2001 and 2002. The collective-action-clause project followed quite naturally 
from the decisionmaking philosophy, policy inclinations, specific experiences, 
and immediate problems faced by the Treasury team in 2001. And although 
collective-action clauses—as an international policy project—are behind us, it is 
interesting to note that the conflict in policymaking approaches between the 
“common law” and “statutory” models of government decisionmaking 
continues to reverberate in the policy debate over the proper government 
response to the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and in many cases it is argued by the 
same players. Rubin and Shultz have retired, but their influence will continue to 
be felt at the Treasury for a long time yet to come. 
